Can We Expect Anything Less Than Perfection in Our Elections Process?

Can We Expect Anything Less Than Perfection to Build Confidence in Our Elections Process?

Elections have come under increasing scrutiny since 2016. That does not mean elections were free of challenges before then.  Indeed, There have always been mistakes, administrative difficulties and disputes. And evidence of significant election fraud in the 19th Century was found. What has changed in the last decade is the level of public attention—and the willingness of candidates, political organizations and voters to question virtually every aspect of the process.

Election officials, including those in Wisconsin, have repeatedly defended the integrity of the system. Recounts and audits have generally confirmed election outcomes, while officials acknowledge that human error can occur. Importantly, those errors have not been shown to have changed the outcome of elections.

But as we approach the 2026 midterm elections, the entire process is under an enormous magnifying glass. And when we place anything under a magnifying glass, we are likely to find imperfections.

Consider three seemingly unrelated examples.

Human error can create suspicion

Wisconsin’s recent primary election provides a good illustration. Milwaukee has traditionally reported its absentee-ballot results later than many other jurisdictions because of the volume of ballots that must be processed. Wisconsin law also does not allow election officials to begin processing those ballots until Election Day.

This year, Milwaukee election officials experienced an avoidable administrative error. Five of nine tabulators at the central count facility had not had their results exported when officials initially left the facility. They returned to the facility under police escort to retrieve the missing results, delaying Milwaukee’s final reporting by approximately 90 minutes.

As reported by FactCheck.AFP, there was no evidence of tampering or that the error affected the results. Yet the incident inevitably raised questions among people already skeptical of the election process. 

That is the challenge election officials face: an innocent mistake can look suspicious when public confidence is already fragile.

Security weaknesses can fuel speculation

Election vulnerability

A second example comes from Puerto Rico, where voting machines were examined for potential security vulnerabilities. As reported in Politico, the examination identified weaknesses in the machines, including concerns about redundant passwords and other security practices. But the examination did not establish that anyone had used those vulnerabilities to alter election results.

This is an important distinction. A vulnerability is not the same thing as an exploited vulnerability. Nevertheless, discovering security weaknesses can provide fuel for those who already question election results. The public understandably wants voting equipment to be secure. At the same time, acknowledging that no complex system is completely free of vulnerabilities does not in itself indicate that an election was compromised.

Prediction markets

A third issue involves the growth of online prediction markets, including platforms such as Kalshi and Polymarket. Supporters argue that prediction markets can provide useful information about the likely outcome of elections and, in some circumstances, may outperform traditional polling. There is evidence that these markets can provide valuable signals, although they certainly are not infallible. (The Washington Post)

However, in terms of election integrity, the concern is different. The financial incentives can create another powerful reason for someone to want to influence an election—personal profit. Many states have laws governing or restricting election-related betting. However, the rapid development of online prediction markets has created new questions for election officials and policymakers. The technology has developed faster than many of the laws designed to regulate it.

None of these three examples demonstrates that an election outcome was changed.

And that is a key point. We expect election officials to administer elections involving millions of voters, thousands of polling places, complicated equipment, absentee ballots, human workers and countless logistical details.

We expect the process to be secure. We expect it to be transparent. We expect mistakes to be corrected, by using backup systems and the allowance for recount. And increasingly, some seem to expect the process itself to be perfect.

Consider our reaction to another relatively rare risk: shark attacks. In 2024, the United States recorded 29 unprovoked shark bites, according to the International Shark Attack File. Millions of Americans swim in oceans every year. Yet a single shark attack can generate enormous media attention and public fear. The risk is real. But our response is generally not to conclude that swimming in the ocean is fundamentally unsafe. Instead, we recognize the risk is incredibly small, take reasonable precautions and continue swimming.

Perhaps elections require a similar mindset.

The goal should not be perfection. The goal should be a system in which errors are identified, security weaknesses are addressed, procedures are transparent, audits are meaningful and there is compelling evidence that the final results accurately reflect the votes cast. The courts play a role in the process as well. For example, as reported by the Campaign Legal Center, more than 60 cases were brought forward to the courts challenging the outcomes of the 2020 presidential election. All but one minor ruling defended the results of the election.

That distinction matters. A delayed election result is not necessarily a compromised election. A security vulnerability is not evidence of manipulation. And an administrative mistake is not necessarily evidence of fraud.

Of course, these issues should not simply be dismissed. Election officials have a responsibility to acknowledge weaknesses, explain what happened and demonstrate how problems will be prevented in the future. Public confidence will not be built by pretending our elections are perfect. It will be built by demonstrating that when imperfections occur, the system is strong enough to find them, correct them and protect the integrity of the final result.

Lee Rasch
LeaderEthics.us